2011年11月20日星期日
2011年11月18日星期五
李嘉誠左手減持中行或套現66億 右手增持長實
除增持自家公司，李嘉誠還將收購觸角伸向英國的水、電等基礎設施領域
“股市不相信承諾”，李嘉誠用實際行動驗證了這句話。《證券日報》記者查閱中國銀行三季報發現，李嘉誠旗下兩支基金退出了十大流通股東，一支基金巨量減 持，最多可能減持了中行19.3億H股，套現66.6億港元，保守計算也要減持約16.7億股。而就在兩年前的長江實業及和記黃埔聯合業績發布會上，李嘉 誠還親口承諾五年內不賣出中行股份。
一邊是拋售中行股份套現，另一邊李嘉誠卻在頻繁出手增持自家公司——長江實業。
據不完全統計，今年5月份至今，李嘉誠已31次增持長江實業，至少耗資6.5億港元，目前持股比例已達42.85%。同時，李嘉誠還頻出大手筆海外收購，尤其青睞英國的水、電等基礎設施領域。
旗下基金兩退一減最多套現66.6億港元
中國銀行三季報顯示，相比今年半年報，李嘉誠旗下Li Ka Shing(Canada) Foundation減持7.86億H股，減持后仍位列第三大流通股東，持有7億H股。另外兩支基金Li Ka Shing Foundation Limited和Li Ka Shing (Overseas) Found則退出了十大流通股東，而在今年半年報中這兩支基金還分別位列第四和第九大流通股東，持有9.9億H股和1.53億H股。
由於李嘉誠持有中行股份不超過5%，故無法獲悉這兩支基金具體減持量，但按照目前第十大流通股東中國人壽旗下一支保險理財產品12920.15萬股的持有 量計算，這兩支基金至少減持了88468萬股，加上前述李嘉誠加拿大基金會確認減持的78588.71萬股，保守估計李嘉誠總共減持167056.71萬 股。按照中國銀行H股三季度3.45港元/股均價計算，大約套現57.6億港元。假如Li Ka Shing Foundation Limited和Li Ka Shing (Overseas) Found全部拋售了手中股份，那么李嘉誠三季度最多可減持約19.3億股，套現66.6億港元。
早在2005年李嘉誠通過蘇格蘭皇家銀行入股中國銀行，當時的入股價僅為1.135港元/股，按照中行三季度3.45港元/股的均價計算，這次減持李嘉誠最多可獲利44.68億港元。
而就在2009年3月26日長江實業及和記黃埔聯合業績發布會上李嘉誠還曾說，旗下基金會拋售了一部分中行股份，余下股份將作長遠投資，“所謂長遠是相當長，用5年來計算，現在并沒有打算賣出”。才剛過去兩年多時間，李嘉誠就食言了。
左手減持中行右手增持長江實業
李嘉誠的“食言”不是從今年第三季度才開始的。本報記者查閱過往資料，今年半年報顯示李嘉誠在二季度季已經開始減持中行股份，二季度李嘉誠將個人持有股份 轉為旗下三支基金持有，在此過程中由一季度的282347.01萬股減至262897.01萬股，減持約1.96億股。以第二季度中行均價4.16港元/ 股計算，估計李嘉誠通過這次減持約套現8.16億港元。
這不是李嘉誠第一次通過個人與旗下基金一減一增達到減持目的。2010年三季報顯示，在去年第三季度李嘉誠的持股量降至25.67億股，較半年報的持股量 30.67億股減少5億股，同時李嘉誠旗下的基金會Li Ka Shing Foundation Limited以3.5億股的持股量出現在十大流通股東里，一減一加之后減持約1.5億股。
李嘉誠在2009年初的發布會上之所以做出5年不出售中行剩余股份的承諾，源於當年1月份曾通過美林證券出售20億股所持中行H股，當時配股價1.98元 /股，套現約39.6億港元，而當時李嘉誠所持中行股份剛剛解禁。李嘉誠最早入股中行是在2005年，蘇格蘭皇家銀行與中國銀行簽署了戰略性投資與合作協 議，根據協議，蘇格蘭皇家銀行將出資31億美元，購入中行10%的股權，這其中有李嘉誠出資的7.5億美元，當時的入股價僅為1.135港元/股。 2008年12月李嘉誠所持限售股剛一解禁，就售出20億股，獲利高達16.9億港元。
值得注意的是，李嘉誠一邊拋售中行股份套現，另一邊卻在大手筆增持自家公司。從今年5月到8月底，李嘉誠先后出手18次，動用資金近3.6億港元，買進長 江實業約339萬股，9月份又9次出手增持，持股數達到了991988744股，持股占比約為42.82%。根據港交所最新資料顯示，李嘉誠在11月又四 次增持長江實業，累計增持48.3萬股，達到992476418股，持股占比增至42.85%。這一系列頻繁的操作總共約耗資6.5億港元，對於自己一手 創辦的長江實業，李嘉誠是在抄底還是護盤，也許只有“股神”自己才能給出解釋。
一位券商銀行業分析師告訴本報記者，隨著歐債危機逐漸蔓延到銀行業，中國銀行面臨的挑戰相比其他國內銀行更大，但并不會構成太大風險，李嘉誠的減持可能是投資策略在改變。
除了增持自家公司，李嘉誠近期癡迷於海外收購，尤其青睞英國的水、電等基礎設施領域。
李嘉誠控股的長江基建(Cheung Kong Infrastructure)今年10月16日宣布，其牽頭的財團完成收購英國水務公司(簡稱NW)，這筆收購共耗資48億英鎊，約合588億港元。去 年10月，長江基建聯合香港電燈共斥資57.7億英鎊約合700億港元收購了法國電力集團(EDF)在英國的電網資產，而這次收購李嘉誠基金也現身其中， 據悉長建與港燈各占收購項目40%的權益，其余20%權益由剛剛退出中行十大流通股東的Li Ka Shing Foundation Limited和Li Ka Shing (Overseas) Found持有。
The Coming Decade Of Deleveraging
1. The Bubble In Credit
Post Crisis Recoveries... Temporary Blip, or permanently altered trajectory?
The current recovery in context...Fine in some respects, but something seems broken
A Crisis of Demand? Not just a matter of lowering rates (the balance sheet-recession)
More Borrowing = More Growth? previous growth was founded upon borrowing - was it real?
How Much Have We Borrowed? More debt in more sectors in more countries than ever before
Wealth Effects - spending only possible because of high net worth
Leading To The Growth Triangle - But Don't Look Down!!!
Love Triangle or Pyramid Scheme?
2. Ways Of Deleveraging
Balancing Government's Books - Austerity works if offset by private leveraging
Assessing The Broader Economy...but the private sector is in savings mode too!
Whole Economy Deleveraging - much harder - unless you debase the currrency
The Effect On GDP - without FX, adjustment is extremely painful!
Bring On The Central Banks - But don't expect them to work miracles
3. Investment Implications
Saved, or Doomed? It's all a question of confidence!
Growth - Lower, but above all, more volatile!!
Expectations Management - Optimism is becoming harder to sustain
Real Estate - Deleveraging + Older Populations = Downward Spiral
Equities - The end of the equity culture?
Banks and Bankruptcies - Be wary of multiples on leveraged instruments
Fixed Income - low yields should eventually make for tight spreads...
Credit -...but only once the bankruptcies are out of the way
Structured Credit - Better the devil you know (EFSF anyone?)
2011年11月17日星期四
It's Official: Total US Debt Passes $15 Trillion
歐債到期日
2011年11月17日歐債危機由西班牙炒到意大利再到法國，以經濟體積來講，是越炒越大。順理推斷下去，下個站應是到德國了。迄今為止德國長短債息皆在下跌，彷彿該國狀態尤佳、地位超然。
然而以去年底國債佔 GDP計，法國 82.3%，德國 83.2%，德國比法國還差。如是擔心法國未來數月到期債務趨升，那末觀圖所見，德國教人擔心的程度不相上下。短線下試 1.28
目前德國只靠避險資金湧入其債市推低債 息，暫避一劫。但資金湧入不是必然的，尤是當其基本因素也不算好之際，只要市場想法一轉，忽然認清真相，德國明年下場，跟今年的法、意難有大別。固之然， 當意大利如希臘般債息達雙位數，歐元已近收檔；當德國也步後塵，歐元可正式收檔。美、日本質一樣，遲早也會收檔，但屬後話。
後話日後再說，回到目前，如圖所示，歐債到期高峯起碼至明年 4月。未來半年，看來炒作主題還在歐債；新聞界就慘了，講到乾塘、寫到墨盡。實話實說，歐元收檔，價位幾多都得；但在此之前會逐格試：短 1.28（年初低位），中 1.14（跌勢底部）。
長的？不是一算。十年前歐元冧，是算二直插 8毫。
羅家聰
交通銀行香港分行市場部
本欄逢周四刊出
2011年11月16日星期三
China's Yield Curve Inversion Signals Sharp Slowdown Ahead
the US 'cannot' be in recession because the yield curve has not inverted. Well, unfortunately for the savior-of-the-universe Chinese economy, their yield curve (the 2s-10s differential) has just inverted for the first time - suggesting, as per Mike Darda of MKM, the Chinese economy is “set to slow rather sharply” and that has “negative implications” for commodities tied to industrial growth. Following on from our discussion of the 1tn RMB deposit infusion bailout, Darda also points out (via Bloomberg) the 8 months-in-a-row of OECD Leading index drops, weakness in the China PMI sub-indices, and the fragility of the shadow banking system via cracks in the real estate market and notes, with a wonderfully indignant note on CB success:
"It is worth remembering that the Fed has engineered only one soft landing in six decades of post-war monetary policy-making (1995)".
Further to this the FT reports a growing concern (noted here by HSBC's CEO Stuart Gulliver) over the potential for an Asian credit crunch both self-created and exogenously-driven by European bank deleveraging:
“The strong increases in credit availability in Asia that has supported demand growth cannot continue indefinitely,” said Mr Gulliver, who was speaking in Hong Kong the day before his bank announces its third-quarter results. “Any reduction in credit availability is likely to be gradual – but it remains a risk policymakers will need to manage. And we need to be careful to monitor the risk of a sharp withdrawal of credit by European banks as a result of events at home.”
And as the rate environment starts to adjust to 'slow' growth and a 'soft-landing', perhaps commodities will continue to slide south. Arguably - a 2s10s steepener on China seems like a way to play a harder-landing and the leading appearance of the commodity index suggests we have lots to look forward to (paging Dr. Copper?).
"It is worth remembering that the Fed has engineered only one soft landing in six decades of post-war monetary policy-making (1995)".
Further to this the FT reports a growing concern (noted here by HSBC's CEO Stuart Gulliver) over the potential for an Asian credit crunch both self-created and exogenously-driven by European bank deleveraging:
“The strong increases in credit availability in Asia that has supported demand growth cannot continue indefinitely,” said Mr Gulliver, who was speaking in Hong Kong the day before his bank announces its third-quarter results. “Any reduction in credit availability is likely to be gradual – but it remains a risk policymakers will need to manage. And we need to be careful to monitor the risk of a sharp withdrawal of credit by European banks as a result of events at home.”
And as the rate environment starts to adjust to 'slow' growth and a 'soft-landing', perhaps commodities will continue to slide south. Arguably - a 2s10s steepener on China seems like a way to play a harder-landing and the leading appearance of the commodity index suggests we have lots to look forward to (paging Dr. Copper?).
The CRB index appears to lead curve regime shifts - is the front-end of China's yield curve about to pop?
UPDATE: While the on-the-run 2y yield did trade above the 10Y yield on 9/26
(2s10s inverted), Bloomberg's generic 2Y CNY yield index has not updated in
three weeks meaning Mr. Darda's analysis is based upon faulty information. We do
not ethat since late September's inversion, however, the curve has begun to
steepen - which fits with the cycle turn analysis he discusses. (h/t SD!)
See below for the on-the-run 2Y and 10Y CNY bond yields:
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